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6.1 Introduction
Sharp reductions in current account deﬁcits can be disruptive. Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin (1997) in their seminal study of the phenomenon,
known as current account reversals, emphasize the dangers of large current
account deﬁcits that must be compressed when external ﬁnancing dries up.
Their study, written in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, presumably had
countries like Thailand in mind. The authors cite other disruptive rever-
sals, such as Uruguay’s at the beginning of the Latin American debt crisis,
when ﬁnancing for the current account deﬁcit collapsed and growth fell
from  5 percent to –7 percent.1 Looking forward, there is the question of
what would happen to growth in the United States if ﬁnancing for the
country’s  5 percent current account deﬁcit evaporated abruptly. Will the
dollar fall, fanning import price inﬂation and forcing the Fed to raise in-
terest rates? How would the housing and stock markets react? Sharp re-
ductions in consumption and investment might have to be brought about
by this rise in interest rates and fall in asset valuations as the current ac-
count is the diﬀerence between investment and saving.
But not all current account reversals are disruptive. In Milesi-Ferretti
and Razin’s own sample, the median change in growth between the periods
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1. Between 1979 to 1981 and 1982 to 1984.is very heterogeneous. For every Uruguay there is a Nigeria, where growth
went from –5.5 percent in 1981 to 1983 to  3 percent in 1984 to 1986, de-
spite sharp compression of the current account.
From an analytical standpoint, this is not surprising. Deﬁcits develop
for diﬀerent reasons. A deﬁcit reﬂecting a temporary surge in investment
owing to unusually rapid productivity growth and high proﬁtability will
have diﬀerent implications than a deﬁcit reﬂecting a temporary surge in
consumption produced by the growth of public consumption or overvalu-
ation of the currency. Equally, current account deﬁcits can be eliminated
for number of very diﬀerent reasons, which are likely to have very diﬀerent
output eﬀects.
Nor is it clear that current account reversals were always as disruptive
as in recent years. The obvious contrast is the period before World War I,
when very large deﬁcits were allowed to develop and persist. Bayoumi
(1989) considers average current account deﬁcits over periods as long as
1870 to 1913 and ﬁnds that these reached high levels in countries like Aus-
tralia and Canada. Taylor (1996) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) do the
same over successive decades starting in the late nineteenth century and
show that current account balances were larger in that period than anytime
in the twentieth century. To be sure, some of these deﬁcits were compressed
abruptly with interruptions to the ﬂow of external ﬁnance, reﬂecting a
combination of rising interest rates in the capital-exporting countries and
economic and political problems in the capital importers, and led to seri-
ous economic and ﬁnancial diﬃculties. Instances springing to mind where
current account deﬁcits fell sharply and precipitated banking or currency
crises include Denmark in 1885 to 1886, Argentina in 1889 to 1890,
Canada in 1890 to 1891, Australia in 1891 to 1892, Brazil in 1896 to 1897,
Japan in 1899 to 1900, and Finland in 1900 to 1901.2 Although crises can
occur for reasons other than those associated with current account rever-
sals, the connections between the two phenomena are clear.
At the same time, crises—currency crises in particular—were lower in
frequency under the gold standard than in recent years.3 Indeed, another
reading of gold standard experience is that the economic and political en-
vironment made current account reversals less of a problem. Greater wage
and price ﬂexibility in an era of unstructured labor markets facilitated the
adjustment of relative prices when the current account balance had to be
compressed abruptly (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1996). With government
budgets close to balance in peacetime, the twin deﬁcits problem that gives
rise to bad current account deﬁcits, ﬁnancing for which dries up suddenly
when concerns arise about the sustainability of public debts, was less
206 Muge Adalet and Barry Eichengreen
2. These are all years of or adjoining banking and currency crises as independently dated
by Bordo and Eichengreen (2003).
3. This is the ﬁnding of Bordo and Eichengreen (2003).prevalent. Because large current account deﬁcits reﬂected unusually high
levels of investment in export-supporting infrastructure, those deﬁcits
could be smoothly reduced by increased savings out of progressively higher
domestic incomes and increases in exports of goods and services (Feis
1930; Fishlow 1986).4 Because the credibility of the commitment to ex-
change rate stability was beyond reproach, events that might have inter-
rupted capital inﬂows and forced disruptive compression of the current ac-
count elicited capital inﬂows that allowed that deﬁcit to be wound down
smoothly rather than precipitating a crisis. Some of these tales are consis-
tent with fewer or smaller current account reversals, while others are con-
sistent with smaller output losses (smoother adjustment to equally fre-
quent or large current account shocks).
These observations suggest a series of questions. Were current account
reversals less frequent under the gold standard? Were their growth eﬀects
less disruptive? And if there are diﬀerences across epochs, what is their ex-
planation?
Bracketed by the gold standard and the post-1970 ﬂoat were the 1920s
and 1930s, when capital ﬂow volatility, economic instability, and ﬁnancial
crises were pervasive, and the Bretton Woods quarter century, when capi-
tal ﬂows were limited, recessions were rare, and banking crises were essen-
tially nonexistent. Given the contingent nature of the connection between
economic volatility on the one hand and current account reversals on the
other, it would be illuminating to know whether reversals were larger, more
frequent, and more disruptive in the interwar period—and smaller, less
common, and less disruptive under Bretton Woods.
In what follows we take a ﬁrst cut at measuring the frequency, magni-
tude, and eﬀects of current account reversals in the gold standard era (1880
to 1914), the interwar period (1919 to 1939), Bretton Woods (1945 to
1970), and the post-Bretton Woods ﬂoat (1972 to 1997). We use regression
analysis to see how far we can get in ascribing cross-period diﬀerences to
observable characteristics of countries and the international economic
environment.
The results conﬁrm that the gold standard era and the period since 1970
diﬀered strikingly from one another: reversals were smaller and less fre-
quent in the gold standard years. Controlling for, inter alia, the size of the
initial current account imbalance, the movement in the real exchange rate
and the state of the global economy does not make this diﬀerence go away.
Evidently, there was something else about the gold standard years that ren-
dered current accounts more stable. But when reversals did take place,
their eﬀects were every bit as disruptive as after 1945. This prompts us to
consider a set of case studies in an eﬀort to shed more light on the issue.
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4. We can think of this as a somewhat reﬁned version of the Lawson Doctrine as applied to
the gold standard.The intervening period from the 1920s through the 1960s is more diﬃ-
cult to characterize. The two interwar decades emerge here, as elsewhere,
as years of instability: reversals were frequent and large and had major out-
put costs. Under Bretton Woods, in contrast, reversals were few and small;
in both respects this period resembles the gold standard years. These facts
are presumably explicable in part by the prevalence of capital controls and
tight regulation of domestic ﬁnancial markets.
Finally, the years since 1972 are grouped with the gold standard years in
terms of ease of adjustment to reversals. The output losses from current ac-
count reversals appear to be signiﬁcantly smaller not just compared to the
interwar years (which is not surprising) but also compared to Bretton
Woods. In the conclusion, we speculate about what changes in markets and
institutions might help to account for this fact.
6.2 The Country Sample
Our empirical analysis utilizes data from Bordo and Eichengreen (2003)
extended to incorporate additional variables and countries.5 The principal
sources are compendia and monographs containing national historical
statistics for the period prior to 1913, publications of the League of Na-
tions for the interwar period, and standard World Bank and International
Monetary Fund sources after World War II. The resulting data set has
been checked and adjusted for compatibility.6
A problem for any study that undertakes historical comparisons over
long periods is the country sample. Reasonably complete macroeconomic
statistics including not only gross domestic product (GDP) and trade but
also ﬁnancial variables are available back to the late nineteenth century
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5. For a more extensive discussion of data sources, see that publication.
6. Several limitations of these data are worth noting. The current account estimates for the
period before 1945 build on reported ﬁgures for imports and exports of goods and services,
following inter alia Bayoumi (1990), Taylor (1996), and Obstfeld and Taylor (2004). This
leaves open the possibility that some service items are under- or unreported (imports and ex-
ports of shipping, insurance and ﬁnancial services, for example). In addition, there is the pos-
sibility of spurious volatility in earlier (speciﬁcally, pre-1914) output data (Romer 1986). To
the extent that this bias exists, it will presumably exaggerate the diﬀerence between growth
rates during expansions and contractions and therefore the magnitude of the output eﬀects of
current account reversals. Finally, some variables that have proven popular in recent analyses
of the causes and consequences of current account reversals (measures of the composition of
the public debt, for instance) are not readily available for this earlier period and are therefore
excluded from the analysis. In particular, information on the capital account, as distinct from
the current account, is not readily available for earlier periods. (For an idea of what kind of
distinct data on international capital ﬂows exist for the period prior to 1913, see Bloomﬁeld
1963, 1968; Stone 1999.) Data on reserves and imports and exports of goods and services cap-
ture capital ﬂows imperfectly to the extent that they do not measure trade in certain ser-
vices—see the preceding—and to the extent that information on foreign exchange reserves is
incomplete. The analysis here follows Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1997), who similarly focus
on the current account reversals but do not look separately at sudden stops in capital ﬂows,
unlike Edwards (2004a,b), who looks at both.only for a subset of Western European countries, overseas regions of re-
centEuropean settlement (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand), and a few of the larger Latin American countries (Argentina and
Brazil). The question is whether to follow this same group of countries over
time (as in, for example, Taylor [1996] and Obstfeld and Taylor [2004]) or
to add additional countries as more data become available (as in inter alia
Bayoumi 1989).
Both approaches have drawbacks. Following the same ten to ﬁfteen Eu-
ropean countries and oﬀshoots over the entire 120 years maximizes the
comparability of the country sample at the cost of representativeness. If we
are interested in the determinants and consequences of current account re-
versals in modern-day emerging markets and how these compare with such
reversals in their historical antecedents, then a sample that includes at most
a couple of modern-day emerging markets is not likely to be representative
of their experience. If, on the other hand, one freely adds more countries as
data on these become available, then one ends up with better representa-
tion of modern emerging markets but also with problems of intertemporal
comparability. At the beginning of the period, the sample will mainly com-
prise a small number of relatively advanced industrial economies, while at
the end of the period it will be dominated by a large number of low-income
countries, where the causes, consequences, and incidence of current ac-
count reversals may be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Assume, for example, that
current account reversals are more frequent in low-income countries.
Adding more low-income countries as data on them become available over
time will then bias the analysis toward the conclusion that reversals have
been growing more frequent purely as a result of sample composition.
We therefore take a third approach to sample selection. Our strategy is
to deﬁne a consistent criterion in terms of relative per capita income—that
is, a threshold value of per capita income relative to the highest income
country in the ﬁrst period, 1880 to 1913—and to add additional countries
as data on them become available only if they satisfy this criterion.7We cal-
culate for the period 1880 to 1914 the ratio of per capita income in the low-
est income country in the sample for that period (Brazil) to the highest in-
come country (the United States), which turns out to be 0.6. As data for
more countries become available, we then add all countries whose per
capita incomes are at least 60 percent of the per capita incomes of the lead
country. In 1919 to 1939, for example, the lead country is again the United
States, so we add all countries whose per capita incomes are at least 60 per-
cent of U.S. levels for which we have comprehensive data. We do the same
for the Bretton Woods period and again once more for the post-Bretton
Woods years.
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7. Observations for very low income economies are also limited toward the beginning of the
sample period because many such economies were not then independent countries.The resulting country sample is shown in appendix table 6A.1. One can
see how sample size increases over time, while sample composition is not
unduly dominated by low-income countries, which are necessarily omitted
at the beginning of our long historical period. Thus, our analysis of current
account reversals should be thought of as characterizing their incidence
and consequences in middle- and high-income countries (also referred to
in the literature as emerging and advanced markets) but not also in the
poorest countries. Insofar as the economic volatility tends to be higher and
dependence on capital ﬂows is less in the poorest countries, separate anal-
ysis of such countries would seem appropriate. In some of the analysis that
follows, we compare what we ﬁnd using this limited sample for the post-
1970 period with results obtained using the somewhat larger country
sample employed by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin as a way of gauging the con-
sequences of our sampling strategy.
6.3 A Brief History of Current Accounts
We set the stage for the analysis that follows by ﬁrst summarizing the his-
torical behavior of current accounts.
Two traditional ways of doing so are calculating the mean absolute value
of the current account over some period of time (say, ﬁve years) and run-
ning Feldstein and Horioka (1980) regressions of the two components of
the current account (investment and savings) on one another. Obstfeld and
Taylor (2004) have done this for ﬁfteen countries similar to our pre-1914
sample. They report that the average absolute value of the current account
balance as a share of GDP was between 3 and 4 percent prior to 1914. The
(absolute) current account remains at a relatively high 3.9 percent in the
immediate post-World War I years (1919 to 1926), reﬂecting the excep-
tional investment demands associated with postwar reconstruction (the
largest value is for France), but then falls to 2.7 in 1927–31 and 1.5 in 1932
to 1939 as capital controls are imposed and international ﬁnancial markets
shut down. The average absolute value of current accounts was small in the
Bretton Woods years, when capital ﬂows were still heavily controlled (1.8
percent of GDP in 1947 to 1959 and 1.3 percent in 1960 to 1973), before
rising in 1974 to 1989 and 1989 to 2000 (to 2.2 percent and 2.3 percent, re-
spectively), higher than under Bretton Woods but not the same levels wit-
nessed before 1914.8
Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) also run a succession of cross section regres-
sions using ﬁve-year averaged data of investment on savings and a constant
term. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that capital mobility
and hence the average magnitude of current account balances traces out a
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8. Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) also look at wartime current account balances, which we do
not consider here.U-shaped pattern over time. The savings-retention coeﬃcient (the esti-
mated eﬀect of savings on investment) is 0.5 until 1914, 0.6 to 0.7 in the
1920s, 0.8 to 0.9 in the 1930s, 0.9 in the Bretton Woods years, and 0.7 to 0.8
in the post-Bretton Woods sample. Like the summary statistics in the pre-
vious paragraph, this regression analysis suggests that while capital mo-
bility is higher today than in the third quarter of the twentieth century, it
has yet to rescale the peak reached before 1914.9
While these results provide a summary measure of ex post capital mo-
bility in a constant sample of countries, it is not clear that they adequately
summarize capital mobility in the world as a whole as the number of inde-
pendent countries—and the number of middle- as well as high-income
countries potentially connected to international capital markets in partic-
ular—is changing over our twelve decades. Bear in mind, as emphasized in
the preceding, that we are concerned with middle- and high-income coun-
tries and systematically omit from our sample low-income countries that
are plausibly less connected to international capital markets (and for which
data are scarce). To the extent that our country sample corrects for this, we
may paint a somewhat diﬀerent picture. A further problem with these esti-
mates is that for almost all of these cross section estimates of the savings-
retention coeﬃcient the conﬁdence levels overlap.10While the tendency for
this coeﬃcient to be larger toward the middle of the sample period suggests
a U-shaped time proﬁle for capital mobility (high toward the beginning and
end of the period), it is not clear whether the intertemporal diﬀerences are
signiﬁcant—and thus whether the null of a random ﬂuctuation around the
average can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of a U-shaped
time proﬁle of capital mobility.
We may be able to do better insofar as our criterion for selecting coun-
tries allows the sample to expand over time, while still applying consistent
conditions for an observation’s inclusion in the sample. The ﬁrst column of
table 6.1 shows the mean absolute value of current accounts for various
subperiods for our sample; column (2) is the comparison with Obstfeld and
Taylor (2004). We still observe a U-shaped pattern, with the magnitude of
current account balances dipping down in 1927 to 1931 and 1932 to 1939.
Our numbers are essentially the same as Obstfeld and Taylor’s through
1939 but larger for the recent period. Taken literally, this suggests, contrary
to Obstfeld and Taylor, that international capital markets are more inte-
grated than before 1913, not less.11 The diﬀerence reﬂects our sampling
strategy and our addition of more relatively small countries with relatively
large current account balances, especially in the last subperiod. Figure 6.1
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9. It has not even matched the levels reached in the 1920s.
10. In part, this is presumably a function of the small samples of twelve countries for each
point in time.
11. That capital markets are more integrated today than before 1914 is also the conclusion
of Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin (1999), who use an entirely diﬀerent approach.provides visual conﬁrmation of these patterns. It is also a reminder, how-
ever, that conﬁdence intervals are wide so that not too much should be
made of these diﬀerences.
Table 6.2 is another reminder of this fact. Using a diﬀerent periodiza-
tion, it reports estimates of the associated savings-retention coeﬃcients.
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Table 6.1 Mean absolute value of current accounts, percent of GDP
(unweighted averages)











aThis value is from Taylor (1996); Obstfeld and Taylor (1994) provide a statistic for the longer
period 1870–1889.
Fig. 6.1 Mean absolute value of current account as a percent of GDP
Source: See text.
Note: War years are excluded from the sample.(Figure 6.2 is a graphic depiction of our estimates.) The savings-retention
coeﬃcients are 0.58 for the prewar period, 0.88 for interwar period, 0.86
for the Bretton Woods period, and 0.73 for the post-1971 sample. This
methodology and periodization thus suggest that capital mobility was
slightly higher before 1914 although the contrast here is more muted than
in some previous results (see, e.g., Bayoumi 1989).
Thus, our new sample, intended to facilitate summary characterizations
of diﬀerences in the extent of global capital mobility over time rather than
simply following an unchanging country sample, broadly conﬁrms the
standard historical interpretation but also provides some new nuances.
6.4 From Current Accounts to Current Account Reversals
We now move from current account balances to current account rever-
sals, deﬁned as episodes in which the current account strengthens sharply,
generally moving from deﬁcit to surplus in three or fewer years. It is useful
at this point to reiterate what was said in the introduction about why we fo-
cus on these episodes. Current account balances have a number of positive
functions that appear in textbooks under the heading of “the intertempo-
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Table 6.2 Estimates of savings-retention coeﬃcient for successive ﬁve-year periods,
current sample
Period Coeﬃcient Standard error 95% conﬁdence interval
1880–1884 0.534 0.198 0.099 0.970
1885–1889 0.311 0.145 –0.003 0.625
1890–1894 0.536 0.141 0.231 0.840
1895–1899 0.668 0.114 0.421 0.915
1900–1904 0.548 0.132 0.262 0.833
1905–1909 0.567 0.207 0.119 1.014
1910–1914 0.581 0.206 0.135 1.027
1920–1924 0.590 0.219 0.107 1.073
1925–1929 0.613 0.196 0.185 1.041
1930–1934 0.783 0.074 0.622 0.944
1935–1939 0.927 0.068 0.780 1.075
1945–1949 0.667 0.128 0.395 0.939
1950–1954 0.721 0.069 0.576 0.866
1955–1959 0.778 0.057 0.659 0.897
1960–1964 0.744 0.084 0.570 0.919
1965–1969 0.887 0.073 0.737 1.037
1970–1974 0.863 0.069 0.719 1.007
1975–1979 0.708 0.111 0.478 0.938
1980–1984 0.623 0.124 0.368 0.878
1985–1989 0.699 0.122 0.448 0.951
1990–1994 0.598 0.113 0.365 0.832
1995–1999 0.452 0.112 0.222 0.683
Source: See text.ral approach to the current account” (see, for example, Obstfeld and Ro-
goﬀ 1996). If the current account strengthens when output is high and
weakens when it is low, its ﬂuctuation is indicative of a country’s ability to
smooth its consumption. An ongoing current account deﬁcit in a rapidly
growing country may also be an indication that investment and growth are
not unduly constrained by domestic savings capacity, facilitating the coun-
try’s convergence to steady-state levels of output and capital intensity. In
practice, however, these advantages may be neutralized or dominated if
large or persistent current account deﬁcits increase the likelihood of dis-
ruptive adjustments that produce large output losses.12Everyone can recall
episodes when large current account deﬁcits ended in the sudden curtail-
ment of ﬁnancing, sharp compression of the current account, and a drop
in economic growth. Yet, as we have also noted, post-1970 experience sug-
gests that not all current account reversals end this way. And it is not obvi-
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Fig. 6.2 Plot of savings-retention coeﬃcients and conﬁdence intervals, successive
ﬁve-year periods (1   1880–1884, . . . 22   1995–1999)
Source: See text.
Note: War years are excluded from the sample.
12. This is the warning in the preceding quote from Fischer to the eﬀect that large current
account deﬁcits are leading indicators of impending problems. His intuition that large cur-
rent account deﬁcits are leading indicators of currency and banking crises gains further sup-
port from the literature on early warning systems for emerging markets (Goldstein, Kamin-
sky, and Reinhart 2000).ous a priori that large current account deﬁcits bore the same association
with instability in earlier periods, such as the pre-1914 gold standard years.
Thus, we wish to determine whether current account reversals were al-
ways a problem—whether they have always been frequent and disruptive.
If current account reversals were not always a problem, then it will be im-
portant to establish why. Hopefully the answer will point to policy mea-
sures that can be taken at the national or international levels to tilt the costs
and beneﬁts of international capital mobility in socially desirable direc-
tions.
To identify current account reversals we use the same criteria as Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin. We construct two variants of their measure, denoted
Rev1 and Rev2. Rev1 (and Rev2) must satisfy three criteria: the average
current account deﬁcit must fall by 2 (3) percent of GDP between the ﬁrst
three and second three years; the maximum deﬁcit in second three years
must be no larger than minimum deﬁcit in ﬁrst three years; and the average
deﬁcit must fall by at least a third (as a percentage of GDP) between the
ﬁrst three and second three years. Obviously, the 2 percent cutoﬀgenerates
more reversals than the 3 percent cutoﬀ.
A list of the individual reversals for the pre-1970 period, excluding re-
versals occurring in consecutive years and reversals occurring in wartime,
appears as appendix table 6A.2.
6.5 Statistical Findings
Table 6.3 summarizes the frequency of reversals under the gold stan-
dard, the interwar period, Bretton Woods, and the post-Bretton Woods
years. Rev1 (based on two percent reductions in the current account deﬁcit
relative to the three preceding years) shows that a lower frequency of re-
versals under the gold standard than under any of the subsequent regimes.
There are 59 reversal episodes (11 percent of the period sample of years) in
1880 to 1914, 102 episodes (27 percent of the sample) in 1918 to 1939, 62
episodes (12 percent of the sample) in 1945 to 1972, and 361 episodes (26
percent of the sample) in 1972 to 1997. So measured, reversals were rela-
tively infrequent under the gold standard and Bretton Woods but much
more frequent during the interwar period and since the collapse of Bretton
Woods. If one excludes reversals occurring in consecutive years, their num-
ber falls to 30, 35, 28 and 101, but the ranking of frequencies (6, 10, 5, and
10 percent) remains basically unchanged, the main diﬀerence being that
the Bretton Woods period looks slightly better than the gold standard
years. From the perspective of the historical literature, these contrasts are
not surprising; the interwar years and recent decades are both periods
when there was much commentary about capital ﬂow volatility, unusually
severe recessions and ﬁnancial crises, all of which may be correlates of cur-
rent account reversals.
Current Account Reversals: Always a Problem? 215To be sure, simple tabulations do not tell us why reversals were more fre-
quent in some periods than others. Candidate explanations include, inter
alia, volatile policies, volatile ﬁnancial markets, and a volatile global eco-
nomic environment. We will consider these possibilities more directly in
the following.
Figure 6.3shows the number of reversals by year. In the ﬁrst panel of ﬁg-
ure 6.3 for the gold standard, the largest cluster is in the ﬁrst half of the
1890s following the Baring-Argentina crisis and the collapse of interna-
tional lending. In the interwar period, reversals are spread fairly evenly
over the immediate postwar years, the 1920s, and the early 1930s, reﬂect-
ing macroeconomic turbulence, shocks to international ﬁnancial markets
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Table 6.3 Time distribution of reversals
Pre-1885 1885–1889 1890–1894 1895–1899 1900–1904 1905–1909 1910–1914 Total
REV1
No reversal 26 77 67 76 79 93 66 484
Reversal 2 5 18 9 13 2 10 59
REV2
No reversal 28 81 76 83 86 94 73 521
Reversal 19261 3 2 2
1918–1922 1923–1927 1928–1932 1933–1937 1938 Total
REV1
No reversal 40 66 67 83 18 274
Reversal 28 27 32 14 1 102
REV2
No reversal 45 74 76 88 19 302
Reversal 23 19 23 9 74
1945–1949 1950–1954 1955–1959 1960–1964 1965–1969 1970–1972 Total
REV1
No reversal 52 79 94 97 94 57 473
Reversal 20 216366 6 2
REV2
No reversal 54 89 98 100 100 63 504
Reversal 18 11 2 31
1970–1974 1975–1979 1980–1984 1985–1989 1990–1994 1995–1998 Total
REV1
No reversal 96 179 179 198 213 104 969
Reversal 24 58 97 88 74 20 361
REV2
No reversal 17 193 209 221 242 114 996
Reversal 13 44 67 65 45 10 244
Source: See text.
Note: REV1 and REV2 refer to a fall in the current account deﬁcit of at least 2 or 3 percent over three years
with respect to the preceding three years.(associated with failed stabilization eﬀorts, reparations disputes and so
forth), the rise in U.S. interest rates in 1928 (which led to the sharp curtail-
ment of foreign lending) and then onset of the Great Depression and wide-
spread debt default starting in 1931. Reversals are relatively few in the mid-
to-late 1930s, reﬂecting the widespread adoption of trade and capital
controls through which countries balanced their current accounts and lim-
ited their dependence on capital ﬂows. Under Bretton Woods, reversals are
concentrated in the ﬁrst postwar quinquennium and centered in Europe.
This was the period when postwar foreign aid that had ﬁnanced current ac-
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Fig. 6.3 Number of reversals by year (Gold standard, interwar, Bretton Woods,
post-1970)count deﬁcits was drawing to a close and foreign reserves had been run
down, forcing countries to balance their trade accounts.
Next we calculated the magnitude of reversals in each period, measured
as the change in the current account to GDP ratio between the three pre-
reversal and three postreversal years. The magnitude of reversals so mea-
sured was 3.13 percent of GDP under the gold standard, 6.43 in the inter-
war years, 3.51 under Bretton Woods, and 5.46 since the breakdown of that
system. Evidently, reversals were largest in the interwar years but only
slightly smaller after 1970. They were smallest under the gold standard, but
only slightly smaller than under Bretton Woods when international capital
ﬂows and the magnitude of feasible current account balances were tightly
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Fig. 6.3 (cont.)constrained. The special nature of gold standard experience compared to
the two other periods of high capital mobility comes through clearly from
this comparison.13
Table 6.4 shows summary statistics for GDP growth and the change in
growth in the year of the reversal and windows ranging from one to four
years following its occurrence. Growth is slower in reversal than nonrever-
sal years, and it generally remains depressed for one or two additional
years before bouncing back. Subsequently, growth in the reversal cases
generally exceeds growth in the nonreversal cases, as output lost in the re-
versal episodes is made up. The v-shaped output response to reversals has
been noted previously; see, for example, Calvo (2005).
Gauged in terms of the diﬀerence in growth rates between reversal and
nonreversal years, reversals were less costly—as well as smaller and less
frequent—prior to 1914. Growth was not signiﬁcantly slower in reversal
than nonreversal years before 1914 (the diﬀerence in growth rates, of –0.02
percent, is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at standard conﬁdence lev-
els), 2.68 percentage points slower in the interwar years, and 3.75 percent-
age points slower in the Bretton Woods years (Rev1 deﬁnition). It is tempt-
ing to interpret the growing output costs of reversals as reﬂecting a secular
decline in wage, price, and general economic ﬂexibility over time (see, e.g.,
Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1996).
However, the diﬀerence in growth rates between reversal and nonrever-
sal years falls to 1.32 percentage points after 1972, though that diﬀerence
is still statistically signiﬁcant at the 99 percent conﬁdence level. Note that
this is a diﬀerent intertemporal pattern than we found for the frequency of
reversals and their magnitude, both of which were greater after 1972 than
in the Bretton Woods years. It also becomes hard to identify diﬀerences
across regimes when we look at the longer term impact of reversals (the
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13. As an alternative, we also scaled the change in the current account to GDP ratio by the
initial current account balance (as a share of GDP, where initial is deﬁned as the average over
the three years preceding the event). Because the magnitude of the scaling factor varied across
periods, this can be thought of as a period-speciﬁc measure of the magnitude of reversals (one
that controls for diﬀerences across periods in, inter alia, the extent of international capital
mobility and therefore the size of current account deﬁcits in the typical prereversal period).
The change in the current account to GDP ratio in (the three) subsequent years as a percent-
age of the initial (three-year) current account ratio is 79 percent, 210 percent, 190 percent,
and 112 percent in our four chronologically successive periods. The main diﬀerence here is
that Bretton Woods appears as a period of relatively large reversals, so scaled. Of course, the
reason reversals appear so large under Bretton Woods when expressed as a percentage of the
initial current account ratio is that those initial current account deﬁcits were so small, re-
ﬂecting the prevalence of controls on capital inﬂows and the demoralized state of interna-
tional ﬁnancial markets. Indeed, there are no very large current account deﬁcits in the Bret-
ton Woods years comparable to those evident in other periods, and the largest current
account deﬁcits in the Bretton Woods years tend to be concentrated in 1945 to 1950, when
there were still reserves and foreign aid to ﬁnance them (see the preceding). The unweighted
average of the current account deﬁcit in the three years preceding the reversal episodes is 3.8
percent of GDP under Bretton Woods, compared to 5.2 in the interwar period and 5.7 in the
post-Bretton Woods years (and 4.9 under the gold standard).Table 6.4 Summary statistics for GDP growth (reversal and no-reversal episodes)
Mean Standard deviation t-statistics
Gold standard
Year of Reversal 2.79 5.08 –0.03
No reversal 2.81 0.95
1 Reversal 1.15 4.70 –0.80
No reversal 1.95 1.31
2 Reversal 3.59 6.28 0.95
No reversal 2.38 1.59
3 Reversal 6.22 4.14 4.51
No reversal 2.45 1.36
4 Reversal 3.47 5.35 0.26
No reversal 3.10 1.43
Interwar
Year of Reversal 0.60 6.83 –2.57
No reversal 3.28 4.77
1 Reversal 3.28 14.28 –0.33
No reversal 4.03 4.81
2 Reversal 3.96 11.18 –0.41
No reversal 4.66 4.19
3 Reversal 3.32 6.60 –1.44
No reversal 4.63 4.41
4 Reversal 5.61 5.16 1.43
No reversal 4.31 3.87
Bretton Woods
Year of Reversal 5.39 3.91 –2.50
No reversal 9.14 5.69
1 Reversal 6.94 6.03 –1.89
No reversal 9.94 6.34
2 Reversal 6.15 5.19 –1.30
No reversal 8.05 5.39
3 Reversal 4.74 4.72 –1.28
No reversal 6.19 3.14
4 Reversal 5.21 5.03 –0.95
No reversal 6.37 2.77
Post-1970
Year of Reversal 1.85 5.53 –3.30
No reversal 3.57 1.42
1 Reversal 2.73 5.82 –1.44
No reversal 3.45 1.13
2 Reversal 3.85 4.64 1.09
No reversal 3.40 1.11
3 Reversal 4.12 6.01 1.42
No reversal 3.36 1.34
4 Reversal 4.00 5.78 1.86
No reversal 2.88 1.15
Source: See text.
Notes: T-statistics reported for two-sided null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between reversals
and non-reversals. T-statistics in bold represent rejection of the null hypothesis.change in output between the reversal year and the subsequent three years,
or between the year following the reversal and the subsequent four years).14
Table 6.5reports probit regressions designed to shed light on the incidence
of reversals. All independent variables are lagged. Following Milesi-Ferretti
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Table 6.5 Indicators of reversals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita –0.205∗∗ –0.205 –0.177 –0.300∗∗∗ –0.300 –0.272
(0.099) (0.154) (0.152) (0.108) (0.184) (0.183)
Fiscal balance/GDP –0.014∗∗ –0.014 –0.013 –0.016∗∗ –0.016∗ –0.014
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Trade balance/GDP –0.033∗∗∗ –0.033∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ –0.032∗∗∗ –0.032∗∗∗ –0.034∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012)
U.K./U.S. interest rate 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.009 0.009 0.017
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Lagged U.K./U.S. growth –0.024∗∗∗ –0.024∗∗∗ –0.019∗∗∗ –0.024∗∗∗ –0.024∗∗∗ –0.020∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
U.K./U.S. growth 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Peg –0.063 –0.063 –0.044 –0.091 –0.091 –0.073
(0.075) (0.100) (0.101) (0.078) (0.100) (0.101)
Gold Standard Dummy –0.389∗∗∗ –0.389∗∗ –0.372∗∗ –0.434∗∗∗ –0.434∗∗ –0.439∗∗
(0.115) (0.178) (0.177) (0.132) (0.192) (0.193)
Interwar Dummy 0.142 0.142 0.137 0.092 0.092 0.067
(0.102) (0.135) (0.139) (0.121) (0.148) (0.154)
Bretton Woods Dummy –0.338∗∗∗ –0.338∗∗ –0.349∗∗ –0.330∗∗∗ –0.330∗∗ –0.329∗
(0.107) (0.153) (0.156) (0.112) (0.165) (0.169)
Deﬁcit 0.164∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.134∗ 0.134∗ 0.135∗
(0.069) (0.069) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.073)
Openness 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Capital controls –0.102 –0.102 –0.127
(0.091) (0.134) (0.135)
Constant –1.030∗∗∗ –1.030∗∗∗ –1.062∗∗∗ –0.879∗∗∗ –0.879∗∗∗ –0.891∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.147) (0.148) (0.135) (0.177) (0.180)
No. of observations 1,978 1,978 1,895 1,869 1,869 1,793
Log-likelihood –894.13 –894.13 –864.97 –836.52 –836.52 –810.56
Pseudo-R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Source: See text.
Notes:Dependent variable takes the value 1 if a reversal of at least 2 percent takes place and 0 otherwise.
Standard errors are in parentheses. All the explanatory variables are lagged once. The variable trade bal-
ance to GDP ratio is averaged over the three years before the event to maintain consistency with the def-
inition of reversals. Government surplus to GDP, world interest rate, and growth rates are levels.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
14. We return to this in the following.and Razin, most of the explanatory variables are averaged over the ﬁrst three
years of the six-year window in question to maintain consistency with the def-
inition of reversals themselves.15Given our limited degrees of freedom and in-
terest in intertemporal comparisons, we pool the data for the four periods and
include period-ﬁxed eﬀects. Because certain countries are especially prone to
reversals in certain periods, we use the cluster option in Stata to adjust for the
fact that the error terms for a particular country in a particular period may
not be independent of one another.16 The regressions come in trios. Within
each trio, the ﬁrst column reports robust standard errors. The second clusters
the observations by countries. The third then drops the observations for the
United Kingdom, which we classify as the center country for part of the pe-
riod, on the grounds that reversals in a country that either is or recently was
the ﬁnancial center are a qualitatively diﬀerent phenomenon.17
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin found that reversals are more likely in coun-
tries with large current account deﬁcits, real exchange rates suggesting
growing overvaluation, large government deﬁcits, low per capita incomes,
low reserves, high interest rates at the center, high growth at the center, and
high ratios of concessional to total debt. They consider U.S. interest rates
and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
growth; for the period before 1914, we consider British interest rates and
British growth, while for the interwar period we consider U.S. interest rates
and U.S. growth. Like them, we ﬁnd some evidence that reversals are more
likely in countries with large current account deﬁcits and large budget
deﬁcits, in countries with low per capita GDPs relative to the lead country
(proxying, presumably, for relatively weak institutions and markets), and
in periods when growth rates in the center country are high. We also ﬁnd
that reversals are more likely in more open economies, where here open-
ness may be proxying for economic size. Edwards (2005), in another anal-
ysis of middle- and high-income countries, similarly ﬁnds that reversals are
more likely in relatively small, relatively open economies.18
It is important to mention some of the variables that do not show up as
consistently signiﬁcant. For example, some studies of recent decades have
found that reversals are more likely when the exchange rate is pegged, pre-
sumably making it more diﬃcult to adjust relative prices prior to the event
(Edwards 2004a). Here the coeﬃcient estimates for whether the exchange
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15. See the footnote to the relevant table for details.
16. To be clear, we do not allow for clustering of the error terms for all reversals for, say, Ar-
gentina, but for all reversals for Argentina in a particular period, say, 1880 to 1913 or 1972 to
1998.
17. In contrast, we have no reversals for the United States except in the ﬁrst period, when
we take Britain and not the United States as the center country.
18. Freund and Warnock (chap. 4 in this volume) do not ﬁnd evidence that openness aﬀects
the exchange rate adjustment that accompanies a reversal, but they suggest that the price elas-
ticity of imports and exports and their components used by Mann and Plück (chap. 7 in this
volume) may be a more relevant measure.rate is pegged display never approach statistical signiﬁcance at standard
conﬁdence levels.19 Similarly, the last three columns of the table add a
dummy variable for capital controls. There is some evidence that the main-
tenance of controls limits the incidence of reversals, although this variable
again is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional conﬁdence levels.20
Another noteworthy feature of table 6.5 is that the dummy variables for
the gold standard and Bretton Woods periods are negative and signiﬁcant
(the post-1972 years are the omitted alternative). Recall that we found in
the preceding that reversals were less frequent under the gold standard and
Bretton Woods than in the interwar and post-1972 periods. These coeﬃ-
cients are telling us that this diﬀerence is not fully explained by diﬀerences
in observable country characteristics (the size of the initial imbalances, the
ﬁscal stance, the global growth environment, etc.) but that it is at least par-
tially explicable in terms of other factors that we are not capturing here.
Table 6.6 turns to the consequences of current account reversals. The
dependent variable is growth over three years, starting with the year of the
reversal, as a deviation from the world average for that same three-year pe-
riod following the reversal onset.21 The explanatory variables include the
size of the reversal and a vector of controls (except where indicated other-
wise, averaged over the three years preceding the event). Again, the data
are pooled and estimated with period-ﬁxed eﬀects. The ﬁrst two columns
show ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors. Col-
umns (3) through (6) then cluster the observations by country within each
period.
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19. We replicated Milesi-Ferretti and Razin’s result when we used our sample of countries
but limited the observations to the post-1972 period, but not otherwise.
20. We found essentially the same thing for the four subperiods estimated separately (in re-
sults not reported here), although signiﬁcance levels vary. For the gold standard period, large
prior current account deﬁcits, large prior budget deﬁcits, and low GDP per capita are the
most robust and statistically signiﬁcant determinants of reversal incidence. For the interwar
period, reversals are more likely in countries with lower GDP per capita, large prior current
account deﬁcits and budget deﬁcits, and no capital controls. For the Bretton Woods period,
countries with terms of trade improvement and large current account deﬁcits are more likely
to experience reversals. For the post-1970 sample, a large prior current account deﬁcit and
having a peg are the main determinants of reversals. We also ran our speciﬁcation using the
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin sample of countries in the post-1970 period. The main diﬀerence is
that the GDP per capita changes sign such that countries with relatively high per capita in-
comes are more likely to experience reversals. (Note that the Milesi-Ferretti and Razin sample
does not include the advanced industrial countries, so this result is telling us—consistent with
intuition—that within the sample of emerging markets the higher income emerging markets
more integrated into international capital markets are more subject to reversals.) The main
diﬀerence between these two pooled regressions is that the one using the Milesi-Ferretti and
Razin countries for the post-1970 period shows a positive sign on the interwar dummy (al-
though one that varies in signiﬁcance across speciﬁcations).
21. It makes little diﬀerence if we instead deﬁne the dependent variable as the growth rate
in the subject country over the three-year period and include the global growth rate over the
same period as another independent variable on the right-hand side. In this case, the main
diﬀerence is that the dummy variable for Bretton Woods becomes positive (although it re-
mains insigniﬁcant).The results suggest that reversals were relatively costly when a large cur-
rent account deﬁcit had been allowed to emerge and the real exchange rate
was allowed to become signiﬁcantly overvalued in the preceding period.22
In addition, we consider a dummy variable for whether the current account
was in deﬁcit or surplus in the prereversal period, as in some of our cases
the event in question is one in which a small current account surplus be-
comes much larger, and it can be argued that in this case the output eﬀects
may be easier to accommodate. The results are consistent with this hy-
pothesis. Finally, we added a dummy variable for the presence of controls
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Table 6.6 Consequences of reversals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade balance/GDP 0.077∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.077 0.115 0.085∗∗∗ 0.129∗
(0.026) (0.034) (0.069) (0.082) (0.028) (0.075)
RER overvaluation –0.166∗∗∗ –0.180∗∗∗ –0.166∗∗∗ –0.180∗∗∗ –0.156∗∗∗ –0.169∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.044) (0.031) (0.021) (0.032)
U.K./U.S. interest rate 0.055 0.092 0.055 0.092 0.046 0.075
(0.069) (0.065) (0.064) (0.061) (0.071) (0.073)
U.K./U.S. interest rate ( 1) 0.051 0.031 0.051 0.031 0.082 0.073
(0.077) (0.073) (0.072) (0.066) (0.079) (0.070)
Gold Standard Dummy 0.913∗∗ 0.445 0.913 0.445 0.668 0.013
(0.445) (0.556) (0.918) (1.056) (0.503) (1.426)
Interwar Dummy –2.788∗∗∗ –3.257∗∗∗ –2.788∗∗∗ –3.257∗∗∗ –3.959∗∗∗ –4.702∗∗∗
(0.477) (0.568) (0.863) (0.967) (0.533) (1.379)
Bretton Woods Dummy –2.708∗∗ –3.394∗∗ –2.708 –3.394 –2.707∗ –2.806
(1.359) (1.398) (3.100) (3.045) (1.482) (3.279)
Size of reversal –0.097∗∗ –0.097∗ –0.679
(0.042) (0.051) (0.414)
Capital controls –0.391 –0.068
(0.405) (0.048)
External Def. Dummy –0.749∗ –0.828
(0.395) (1.251)
Constant 0.267 1.060∗∗ 0.267 1.060 0.889∗ 1.749
(0.297) (0.513) (0.685) (0.955) (0.462) (1.383)
No. of observations 318 222 318 222 288 199
R2 0.21 0.28 0.21 0.28 0.26 0.33
Source: See text.
Notes:Estimated using OLS with White’s correction for heteroscedasticity. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. Reversal deﬁned according to rev1. The dependent variable is output growth deﬁned as three-
year averages, expressed as deviations from world averages. The explanatory variables trade balance, the
real exchange rate, and the U.K./U.S. interest rates are averaged over the three years before the event.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
22. Freund and Warnock (chap. 4 in this volume) also ﬁnd that large deﬁcits are associated
with slower growth for industrial countries.on capital account transactions on the grounds that such controls may
limit capital ﬂight in the wake of the reversal, again moderating the output
eﬀects. The results are consistent with this intuition: output losses are
smaller when the current account is already in surplus in the prereversal
period and capital controls are present. But again, the addition of these
variables does not alter our earlier ﬁndings.
An additional result is that a number of period dummies show up as sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. A negative (positive) sign means that growth was
slower and output losses were larger (growth was faster and output losses
were smaller) in the period in question: thus we ﬁnd smaller output losses
under the gold standard but larger output losses in the interwar and Bret-
ton Woods periods than in the omitted post-1972 alternative after control-
ling for other observed characteristics of countries and the global environ-
ment (that is, after controlling for the values of the independent variables).
Recall that the simple tabulation of output losses in diﬀerent periods
showed the same thing. That we see the same pattern here suggests that the
other explanatory variables such as the size of the initial current account
imbalance, the overvaluation of the real exchange rate, or the presence or
absence of capital controls do not explain why the typical output loss from
reversals was smaller in some periods than in others.
This result sits uneasily with the cases in section 6.6, which show that the
output eﬀects of current account reversals under the gold standard could
be substantial. Eyeballing the data suggests that prior to 1914 the drop in
output only commenced after a year or more, whereas after 1971 it more
commonly set in immediately. An explanation for this diﬀerent pattern is
the greater incidence of currency crises after 1971, as noted previously, and
the tendency for output to fall with the onset of a crisis. Consistent with
this conjecture, Bordo and Eichengreen (2003) identify currency crises co-
incident with only 7 percent of the current account reversals occurring be-
fore 1914 but coincident with 12 percent of the reversals occurring after
1971.
To determine whether the results were sensitive to this timing, we re-
deﬁned the output response as the change in GDP not between year t (the
year of the reversal) and t   3 but between year t   1 and t   4. When we
do this, the negative coeﬃcient on the gold standard dummy is no longer
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. (The other results are unchanged.) This
suggests that not too much weight should be attached to the results in table
6.6, suggesting that the output losses from reversals were smaller under the
gold standard. Reversals may have been less frequent and smaller, but
when they occurred their output eﬀects could still be severe, especially
when they were accompanied by a currency crisis. (See the next section.)
In comparison, a variety of further sensitivity analyses had little impact
on the results. For example, when we added a vector of country-ﬁxed
eﬀects, the basic results continue to hold. We also experimented with a
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planation for why the output eﬀects of reversals were smaller in some peri-
ods than others is that the reversals themselves were smaller. We therefore
added the size of the reversal (measured here as the change in the current
account ratio between time t – 3 and time t) as an additional explanatory
variable. This has plausible eﬀects; for example, it lowers the signiﬁcance
level on the gold standard dummy in table 6.6, suggesting that one reason
that the output losses associated with current account reversals were
smaller under the gold standard is that the magnitude of the reversals
themselves were smaller. However, the new coeﬃcient is not statistically dif-
ferent from zero, and the other results are little aﬀected by its addition. Fi-
nally, we followed Edwards (2004b) in estimating treatment regressions,
ﬁrst an equation for current account reversals and then a second-stage re-
gression that treats the reversal variable as endogenous.23 The results, in
table 6.7, are consistent with their predecessors. Reversals are more likely
in countries that had been running large external deﬁcits in the immedi-
ately preceding period and where growth was slow. They continue to cause
signiﬁcant output losses, although output begins bouncing back relatively
quickly.
In sum, the results here suggest that the gold standard period was diﬀer-
ent: current account reversals were less frequent and smaller than they
have become subsequently, although when they did occur their output
eﬀects could be substantial. The years since 1972 do not compare unfavor-
ably in these respects with the 1920s and 1930s; if anything, the opposite is
true. But reversals today are more frequent and larger than they were be-
fore 1914. Obvious measures of country characteristics and global eco-
nomic conditions do not seem to account for this diﬀerence. This moti-
vates us to look more closely at a number of episodes of sharp current
account reversals before 1913 to see whether this can help us to understand
better what is going on.
6.6 Case Studies
In this section we consider three prominent pre-1914 current account re-
versals: Argentina in 1889 to 1890, Australia in 1891 to 1892, and Brazil in
1896 to 1897.
6.6.1 Argentina 1889 to 1890
The 1880s was a golden decade for Argentina. The wool and wheat pro-
ducers of the pampas were integrated into world markets by the construc-
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23. In the ﬁrst stage, probit estimates of the treatment equation are obtained. From these
estimates a hazard is then computed. In the second stage, the hazard is included in the esti-
mation of the outcome equation. This augmented outcome equation lets us get consistent es-
timates of the regression disturbance term.tion of ports and railways.24 Argentina already had 2,500 kilometers of
railroad track in 1880, and its ample endowment of productive land prom-
ised the traﬃc to support many more. Labor arrived in abundance; slow
growth in Europe, depressed conditions in that continent’s agrarian econ-
omies, and cheap international passenger rates combined to encourage
more than 1 million immigrant arrivals between 1880 and 1890. (Argentine
government propaganda and subsidies for travel costs did not hurt.) While
only some two-thirds of these immigrants settled permanently, this was a
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Table 6.7 Causes and eﬀects of current account reversals: Two-step estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Growth regression
Initial Log GDP per capita –0.459∗∗∗ –0.483∗∗∗ –0.535∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.136) (0.135)
Population growth 0.564∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.101) (0.100)
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.114∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Peg 0.313 0.329 0.305
(0.243) (0.244) (0.242)
Capital controls 0.702∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗
(0.237) (0.237) (0.235)
Reversal –4.825∗∗∗ –5.700∗∗∗ –6.022∗∗∗
(1.095) (1.139) (1.137)
Lagged Reversal 1.147∗∗∗ 0.562
(0.335) (0.391)
Lagged (2) Reversal 0.878∗∗∗
(0.335)
Determinants of reversal
Trade balance/GDP –0.033∗∗∗ –0.032∗∗∗ –0.031∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Growth –0.022∗∗∗ –0.024∗∗∗ –0.023∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Money/Reserves –0.009∗ –0.009∗ –0.009∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Prewar Dummy –0.591∗∗∗ –0.572∗∗∗ –0.566∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.119) (0.120)
Interwar Dummy –0.053 –0.046 –0.052
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
Bretton Woods Dummy –0.726∗∗∗ –0.717∗∗∗ –0.741∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.108) (0.109)
Lambda 2.164∗∗∗ 2.282∗∗∗ 2.490∗∗∗
(0.649) (0.666) (0.665)
No. of observations 1,919 1,890 1,855
Source: See text.
24. Wheat was ﬁrst exported in 1878.very large increase in labor supply for a country with an 1880 population
of only 2 million.
Britons in particular were galvanized by the attractions of investment in
this economy: new capital calls in London on behalf of the country rose
from little more than £.5 million a year between 1875 and 1880 to nearly £5
million a year between 1881 and 1885 and then £17.5 million annually be-
tween 1886 and 1890.25 The British lent for railway construction, for the
improvement of port facilities, for the development of urban infrastructure
(most of the immigrants of the 1880s settling in the cities), and for the sys-
tem of ranches and meatpacking plants that allowed the exportation of
canned and, eventually, chilled beef. They were active participants in the
real estate, securities market, and banking booms of the period, and they
lent extensively to politically connected provisional mortgage banks.
While domestic and foreign economic events go some way toward ex-
plaining these developments, their timing cannot be understood without
reference to the political consolidation that occurred in Argentina in the
1880s. This was the period when the central state, bolstered by recent mil-
itary victories, asserted its authority over the provinces and the economy.
The rebellion of the province of Buenos Aires was defeated in 1880, and the
city was transformed into the federal capital. The state then established do-
minion over the regions inhabited by indigenous peoples. The territorial
limits of the nation were, for the ﬁrst time, clearly deﬁned. Starting in 1880
a new institutional framework was created based on strong presidential
power, checks and balances exercised by the congress, and prohibition of
presidential reelection. A uniform national money was ﬁnally established.
Basic ﬁscal, administrative, and judicial powers were deﬁned (Botana
1997). Although Romero (2002) remarks that some of these powers were
more notional than real, it is clear that this picture did much to enhance in-
vestor conﬁdence in the administrative capacity of the state. And this, in
turn, facilitated foreign ﬁnance for Argentina’s twin deﬁcits.
Thus, the growth of the current account deﬁcit in the 1880s resulted from
a combination of domestic economic and political factors. Investment was
encouraged by the exceptional commercial opportunities aﬀorded by a pe-
riod of geographical expansion, integration into world markets, large-scale
immigration, and political consolidation; meanwhile, the working-age
population was increasingly dominated by recent immigrants as yet in no
position to support high savings rates. The central government reinforced
the disparity by undertaking public investment projects while running
deﬁcits. For better or worse, the consolidation of the state in the 1880s and
the extensive guarantees provided for private investment (investments in
railways in particular) encouraged foreigners to help ﬁnance the diﬀer-
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25. This is from Stone (1999), table 3. British investment accounted for the majority but cer-
tainly not the entirety of European investment in Argentina in this period; see Ford (1962).ence.26 Not least among the beneﬁciaries was the government itself, which
could borrow abroad in order to ﬁnance public spending on projects that
beneﬁted its clients. Cronyism similarly prevailed in the provinces, whose
governments used provincial banks to contract foreign loans and use the
proceeds to extend credit to the provincial government.
Maintenance of this fragile equilibrium depended on two conditions.
First, there was a considerable gestation period between the initial invest-
ment in export-oriented infrastructure and the coming on line of exports.
Keeping current in the interim on short-run–debt-service obligations
hinged on the willingness of foreign investors to provide a steady stream
ofbridge ﬁnance. Between 1885 and 1890, as Ford (1962, 87) observes, “to
some considerable extent foreign borrowings were employed in paying
service charges on previous foreign loans . . .” One potential explanation
for why current account reversals were smaller and less frequent than in
subsequent periods is that current account deﬁcits reﬂected high levels of
export-oriented infrastructure investment—that is, foreign capital was
devoted to uses that generated additional export revenues that could be
used to make debt service payments in the normal course of events (see
Feis 1930; Fishlow 1986; and the preceding discussion). Analysis of the
Argentine case suggests that this factor may be subject to exaggeration.
Natural complementarities there may have been, but gestation periods
were long.
Second, this happy equilibrium hinged on the credibility of the govern-
ment’s commitments. Paying out on its guarantees required a healthy rise
in public-sector revenues; here the gestation period between the initial in-
vestment projects and the induced rise in economic activity again posed a
problem. Insofar as some of the projects that the government guaranteed
were of low quality—they were likely to neither pay for themselves nor to
induce an increase in revenues through other channels—the authorities
might ﬁnd themselves unable to uphold their part of the bargain. At that
point, capital inﬂows might dry up, forcing the current account deﬁcit to
be compressed.
Thus, the Argentine episode displays many of the characteristics identi-
ﬁed in the preceding analyses as raising the likelihood of current account
reversals and heightening their output eﬀects, prominent among them
large budget and current account deﬁcits in the run-up to the event. In ad-
dition, explanations for the Argentine crisis in this period invoke two fac-
tors also emphasized in modern studies that do not show up in other gold
standard era reversals: tight credit conditions and slowing growth in the
center. The importing country on which Argentina depended most heavily,
Great Britain, experienced a cyclical peak in 1885, and its economy re-
mained oﬃcially in recession through 1889 (the latter being the conven-
Current Account Reversals: Always a Problem? 229
26. Money ﬁnance contributed also, Argentina having gone oﬀ the gold standard in 1884.tionally dated business cycle trough). This made growing Argentine ex-
ports more diﬃcult. At the same time, the stability of British savings rates
and, hence, the inverse ﬂuctuation of home and foreign investment (Cairn-
cross 1953) meant that ample British capital was available to Argentina
and other contemporary emerging markets from the middle of the decade.
But these same relationships rendered Argentina vulnerable to a decline in
the availability of ﬁnance when British growth began to accelerate and in-
vestment picked up starting in 1889 and when the Bank of England began
raising rates. Overall, the 1880s was a decade of low interest rates, reﬂecting
relatively weak investment demand in Europe. Goshen’s 1888 debt conver-
sion took advantage of this fact and put further downward pressure on
yields. Low interest rates encouraged investors to look abroad for higher
yields. As Bailey (1959, 272) put it, London and Edinburgh were soon
“honeycombed with agencies” for collecting money for overseas invest-
ments. But in 1889, the cyclical trough had passed, and British activity began
to accelerate. The Bank of England ratcheted up its discount rate sharply,
from 2.5 to 6 percent over the second half of the year. It is not surprising that
this led to a decline in new issues in London on behalf of Argentina and made
it diﬃcult for Barings to place the Buenos Aires Water Supply and Drainage
Loan. Foreign ﬁnancial factors clearly played a role in this current account
reversal, although it can perhaps be argued that it would have occurred with
or without sharp changes in the Bank of England’s discount rate.27
With the failure of the Buenos Aires waterworks loan and the distress ex-
perienced by Barings, lending to Argentina ground to a halt. Reversing the
current account balance was painful when the prior deﬁcit was so large and
the government budget was in deﬁcit. Successive governments struggled,
with little success, to balance the budget through a combination of tax in-
creases and expenditure reductions and thereby limit the need for moneti-
zation and inﬂation. The need to compress imports in order to facilitate
current account adjustment further complicated this task as import duties
were the single most import source of revenues for the federal government.
Moreover, compressing imports by 50 percent in 1891 and then boosting
exports required sharp depreciation of the real exchange rate, which fur-
ther eroded domestic living standards and depressed consumption. Real
GDP contracted by 4 percent in 1890 and by a further 11 percent in 1891
before bouncing back to  9 percent in 1892 and  5 percent in 1893. Thus,
by the end of 1893, output was roughly back up to where it had been in
1889.28Still, this was a large output drop by the standards of contemporary
current account reversals, reﬂecting the unfavorable initial conditions.
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27. Given its prominence in this case, just why the British discount rate does not show up
more generally in our regressions explaining the incidence of current account reversals re-
mains something of a mystery.
28. Living standards and imports in particular remained below earlier levels, however (Ar-
gentine imports not again reaching 1889 levels until 1904).On the other hand, this was not an exceptionally long recession; that
growth was again positive little more than two years after the reversal was
not atypical.29 Historians point to a number of factors helping to avert a
more extended recession. Argentina avoided having to compress demand
still more sharply and to move the current account into surplus even fur-
ther by restructuring its debt, ﬁrst suspending payments, then obtaining a
bridge loan through the Rothschild Committee suﬃcient to ﬁnance the
federal government’s debt service for three years, securing a reduction of
debt service and holiday on amortization payments, and ﬁnally assuming
the provincial debt at less than 60 percent of its face value.30 As a region of
overseas European settlement dominated by recent immigrant arrivals,
labor exhibited an unusual degree of intersectoral mobility, moving
smoothly from the production of nontraded to traded goods in response to
the depreciation of the real exchange rate.31 World demand conditions
were favorable; export prices rose over much of the 1890s, and there was a
positive technology shock with the coming on line of large scale exports of
chilled beef.32Some of these factors are policies that governments might at-
tempt to pursue in order to cope with current account reversals. But oth-
ers reﬂect factors having to do with the structure of markets and the devel-
opment of technology over which they have little control.
6.6.2 Brazil 1896 to 1897
Brazil’s reversal took place later than Argentina’s, although it was
aﬀected by the same global economic and ﬁnancial developments. Be-
tween 1886 and 1890, Brazil imported only about 40 percent as much
British capital as Argentina, despite enjoying the same low global interest
rates. In part, this reﬂected the prevailing commitment to ﬁscal orthodoxy
and the desire to restore the milreis to its oﬃcial 1846 par; this more con-
servative ﬁscal stance limited the magnitude of the subsequent twin
deﬁcits. In part the diﬀerence reﬂected the fact that Brazilian publicity and
propaganda were less eﬀective. It took the abolition of slavery in 1888 and
the end of the monarchy in 1889 to really put the country on the radar
screen of international investors.33
As in Argentina, the government then used ﬁscal largess to buy and main-
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29. Fishlow (1989a, 90) observes that “the data on railway receipts are suggestive of a less
severe and prolonged downturn than other peripheral economies experienced during the
1890s.”
30. Perhaps not too much should be claimed of this factor, for these negotiations took many
years to complete and were a pervasive source of demoralizing ﬁnancial uncertainty while
still underway.
31. Fishlow (1989a,b) emphasizes labor market ﬂexibility as a factor in adjustment.
32. While Cardoso (1989) emphasizes this factor in explaining Argentina’s recovery from
the 1890 to 1892 crisis, in reality it comes a bit late to explain the questions at hand here (Ar-
gentina exports of chilled beef rise to signiﬁcant levels only in the second half of the 1890s).
33. To be sure, British investors had preferred Brazil earlier in the nineteenth century, but
not in the 1880s.tain the political support of the military and the provinces. In the Brazilian
case there was also the fact that the abolition of slavery imposed ﬁnancial
losses on powerful agricultural interests. The latter sought preferential ac-
cess to cheap credit to compensate for the capital losses suﬀered as a result
of emancipation.34Thus, following the proclamation of the republic in 1889,
domestic interest rates were kept low and the exchange rate was allowed to
depreciate. Sauce for the goose being sauce for the gander, ﬁnancial prefer-
ences were extended to industry as well. The speculative boom that resulted
from the ample provision of credit, ﬁnanced partly by domestic money cre-
ation and partly by foreign borrowing, is known in the Brazilian literature
as the Encilhamento.So soon after the abolition of slavery, and with contin-
uing political uncertainty, domestic conditions were not conducive to high
domestic savings rates. The investment encouraged by the ample availabil-
ity of credit thus bequeathed chronic current account deﬁcits.
It is striking, given the recent literature on contagion, that Brazil did not
experience a current account reversal, as we measure the phenomenon, at
this time. As Cardoso and Dornbusch (1989) note, negative ﬁnancial spill-
overs from Argentina to Brazil were limited. Part of the explanation, for this
as for many things Brazilian, is coﬀee prices, which strengthened from 1890.
But another part may lie in the fact that Brazil satisﬁes less well the leading
indicators of vulnerability to a current account reversal. While current ac-
count deﬁcits were chronic, they were not allowed to widen to the same ex-
tent as in Argentina; Brazil was never the darling of foreign investors to the
same extent. Although the commitment to ﬁscal orthodoxy weakened after
the 1880s, the legacy lived on; budget deﬁcits were never allowed to explode
as they did in Argentina. Less pressure of demand meant less tendency to-
ward overvaluation, which further slowed the development of a patently un-
sustainable external position. As a result, the country retained limited capi-
tal market access: Brazil was able to contract new loans in London, most
prominently in 1893 and 1895 but also a short-term advance in 1896.
In this manner Brazil staggered into the second half of the 1890s. Lim-
ited capital market access to ﬁnance ongoing deﬁcits allowed the debt to
continue rising, which inevitably contributed to growing unease on the part
of foreign investors. After 1893, coﬀee prices weakened, bringing the situ-
ation to a head. By 1896 funding for the current account deﬁcit had dried
up. The trade balance swung from a deﬁcit of a bit less than 1 percent of
GDP to a surplus of more than 5 percent, reﬂecting the magnitude of on-
going debt service obligations. Like Argentina before it, Brazil now se-
cured a funding loan from its London bankers, in this case suﬃcient to
cover the central government’s interest payments for three years. In addi-
tion, amortization obligations were suspended for thirteen years. Fishlow
(1989b) notes that because the eﬀective debt write-down was less than in
232 Muge Adalet and Barry Eichengreen
34. See Fishlow (1989b, 22–23).Argentina (where the issue had been forced by the government’s unilateral
suspension of payments), reliance on internal adjustment measures was
necessarily greater. The budgetary problem was addressed by raising tax
rates and extending them to new products, imposing surcharges on cus-
toms duties, and renting the federal railways to private enterprises. The ex-
change rate was stabilized by withdrawing Treasury notes from circulation,
as required by the conditions attached to the funding loan.
This sharp deﬂation, presided over by Finance Minister Joaquim Murt-
inho, sharply compressed domestic demand. Imports fell, partly owing to
depressed demand but also due to the import surcharges, while more do-
mestic production was freed up for export. Trade deﬁcits gave way to on-
going surpluses, which grew larger after 1900. But the greater reliance in
Brazil on deﬂationary adjustment measures also meant that the output
eﬀects of the reversal were as severe as in Argentina, notwithstanding the
fact that prior conditions would have indicated a less severe recession. Ad-
justment took place mainly through the collapse of investment; the trade
statistics show a sharp decline in imports of industrial equipment. Na-
tional income estimates suggest that GDP declined by 10 percent in 1897
and 5 percent in 1898, mirroring the 1890 to 1891 contraction in Ar-
gentina, before stabilizing in 1899, and then beginning to grow again quite
sharply starting in 1900, aided by strengthening coﬀee prices and the com-
ing on line of rubber exports (although not soon enough to prevent a crisis
in a banking system severely weakened by preceding events).
Thus, the Brazilian case is a reminder that the output eﬀects of a current
account reversal depend not just on inherited macroeconomic and ﬁnan-
cial conditions but also on how the reversal is managed.
6.6.3 Australia 1891 to 1892
In Australia, whose reversal was bracketed temporally by those of Ar-
gentina and Brazil, the government resorted to neither currency deprecia-
tion nor default. While many of the other circumstances surrounding this
episode were similar to those in Argentina and Brazil, imperial identity
meant that default and depreciation were essentially inconceivable. Even
more than in Brazil, then, the burden of adjustment fell on the domestic
economy. In Australia, GDP fell for four years running, from 1890 through
1893, not “just” two. The cumulative fall was on the order of 25 percent, not
“just” 15. Unemployment rose sharply. Immigration slowed and tentatively
reversed direction. Social disorder spread, led by protesting sheep shearers,
dock workers, and miners. Post-1893 recovery, if it may be called that, was
slow and uneven. A summary measure of the severity of the consequent re-
cession is the comparison with Argentina: whereas Argentine real GDP
doubled between 1890 and 1905 according to the conventional national in-
come statistics, Australian GDP in 1905 was a mere 20 percent above what
it had been a decade and a half before. This is especially impressive given
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in the three prereversal years to  0.4 percent of GDP in the year of the
event, was small by the standards of the other countries we are considering.
Australia had been experiencing an investment boom, based in substan-
tial part on investment by nonresidents, oﬀ and on since the gold rushes of
1851. Much of this overseas ﬁnance was devoted to speculative assets, in-
cluding pastoral and urban land. Like the government of Argentina, the
governments of Queensland and New South Wales subsidized the fares of
immigrants. Self-reinforcing capital and labor inﬂows fanned a speculative
building boom. The urban land boom came to a head in the 1880s, fueled
by rapid increases in mortgage lending by savings banks. As a share of
GDP, bank credit (much of which was backed by foreign liabilities) dou-
bled between 1880 and 1890. The majority of the increase went into resi-
dential construction as the rate of return on pastoral activities was declin-
ing and the 1880s was a decade of urbanization. Land and housing prices
shot up in Melbourne in particular.
As in Argentina and Brazil, these developments were not unrelated to
the activities of government, the individual colonial governments in par-
ticular. The Australian colonies competed with one another to attract both
labor and capital, borrowing to build railways into the interior and pro-
viding urban amenities to appeal to recent settlers. As McLean (1996) puts
it, many of these investment projects were based on overly optimistic as-
sessments of the agricultural potential of the semiarid regions of the inte-
rior (reﬂecting temporarily favorable climatic conditions).35 In the second
half of the 1880s, they reﬂected the tendency for low interest rates in Britain
to encourage relatively indiscriminate borrowing and lending. So long as
growth prospects were rosy, government guarantees for the bonds under-
writing the investments were credible. And, of course, these projects were
associated with large current account deﬁcits reﬂecting the propensity to
import locomotives, steel rail, and a wide range of other investment goods.
The stop to lending that followed the Baring Crisis was more pronounced
in Australia than in Brazil. Capital inﬂows fell from £20 million in 1888 to
£l million in 1893. It is tempting to speculate that British investors were im-
pressed by the similar resource endowments of the two pastoral economies
and revised their expectations accordingly—although the fact that the cur-
tailment of lending and current account reversal took place fully a year af-
ter the Baring Crisis is diﬃcult to reconcile with this hypothesis. Given that
“the imperial and Commonwealth tie” (in the language of Lindert and
Morton [1989, 54]) closed oﬀ other options, harsh deﬂationary policies be-
came the order of the day. There was no depreciation of the currency.
Rather, relative prices had to adjust through a grinding downward move-
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35. Very much the same syndrome, reﬂecting the same climatic conditions, was evident in
the United States at this time.ment of wages and costs. Demand was compressed by tight credit, which
discouraged consumption and, in particular, investment. Capital formation
fell from £34 million in 1888 to £16 million in 1892 and £9 million in 1893.
State budgets were brought into rapid balance, further compressing de-
mand. Despite the stop to borrowing, government debt as a share of GDP
rose sharply with declining nominal income through the middle of the
1890s. Meanwhile, there was no relief from the interest burden like that ob-
tained by Argentina (and no delay of amortization like that enjoyed by
Brazil): debt service continued to account for nearly 10 percent of GDP.
This meant that imports had to be compressed sharply. In contrast, exports
were maintained at previous levels (unlike Argentina and Brazil, they did
not rise signiﬁcantly in the wake of the reversal, presumably reﬂecting the
stagnation of the economy). Reﬂecting the impact of deﬂation, the export
share rose from 20 to 28 percent of GDP in the ﬁrst half of the 1890s.
The story would not be complete without reference to the drought that
started in 1895, which nipped the economy’s recovery in the bud. What
coﬀee was to Brazil, wool was to Australia, and the drought of the mid-
1890s had a devastating impact on the pastoral economy. Thus, climate
and not simply policy may explain why recovery in Australia was so diﬃ-
cult and long in coming. However, drought was not an exclusively Aus-
tralian phenomenon in the 1890s, so the decline in pastoral production was
oﬀset to an extent by strong prices. In addition, drought in 1895 cannot ex-
plain why the economy contracted so persistently and severely between
1890 and 1893. Here the fact that the domestic economy was forced to
shoulder the entire burden of adjustment to the current account reversal
cannot be denied.
6.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented some new facts and a mystery. The new
facts concern the pre-1970 history of international capital ﬂows and cur-
rent account reversals. Analyzing a sample of countries with per capita
GDPs at least 60 percent those of the lead country and measuring rever-
sals in a consistent way, we ﬁnd that the incidence of reversals has been un-
usually great in recent years. The only prior period that matched the last
three decades in terms of the frequency and magnitude of reversals was the
1920s and 1930s, decades notorious for the instability of capital ﬂows. In
contrast, reversals were both less common and smaller in the Bretton
Woods and pre-World War I gold standard eras.
That the Bretton Woods years were diﬀerent is no surprise: capital con-
trols were widespread and ﬁnancial ﬂows across borders were suppressed.
Current account reversals were fewer because current account deﬁcits were
smaller, reﬂecting this limited ﬁnance. At the same time, when reversals did
occur, their eﬀects could be severe.
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the absence of impediments to capital ﬂows and the large size of current ac-
count balances. This ﬁnding is clearly related to the much commented
upon smooth operation of the prewar gold standard. Cross-country re-
gressions and case studies alike suggest that the same observable charac-
teristics of countries (large current account and budget deﬁcits in the run-
up, followed by negative shocks to growth at home and abroad) help to
explain the incidence of reversals both before 1914 and after 1971. But con-
trolling for these characteristics of countries and reversal periods does not
make the contrast between the gold standard and recent years go away. Ul-
timately, why reversals were not more frequent and larger in the period of
open capital markets a century ago is still a mystery. To put it another way
that will be familiar to economic historians, the smooth operation of the
classical gold standard remains to be explained.
It would be nice to be able to draw implications from this historical ex-
perience for prospects for the United States today—whether the United
States is at risk of a disruptive reversal if foreign ﬁnancing dries up
abruptly. For a number of reasons, however, attempting to do so is prob-
lematic. First, there is the fact that the century of international economic
history reviewed here does not provide another example of a country that
is so large and important relative to the world economy running such a
massive current account deﬁcit.36 All of the cases reviewed in section 6.6
are necessarily of small countries. Second, there is the fact that much of the
diﬀerence in the incidence of reversals between the gold standard period
and recent years cannot be explained by observable policy variables, as just
emphasized. We do ﬁnd in the larger historical sample a negative correla-
tion between government budget deﬁcits and the incidence of reversals, for
example, suggesting that the smaller size of government, which implied a
smaller response of deﬁcit spending to capital inﬂows, made for less vul-
nerability to reversals—something that does not bode well for the United
States. But the experience of East Asia in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s reminds
us that this is only one factor inﬂuencing susceptibility to sharp shifts in the
direction of capital ﬂows. And the more fundamental issue is that a signif-
icant portion of the diﬀerence in susceptibility to such shifts before 1913 is
not explicable in terms of this and other observable policy variables. Third
and ﬁnally, it is empirically diﬃcult and analytically problematic to at-
tempt to construct for the period before 1913 measures of institutional
quality, which many observers think might shape the incidence of rever-
sals. Political and social systems were diﬀerent, standing in the way of
simple comparisons of the eﬀects of, inter alia, governmental turnover, the
extent of encompassing coalitions, or the approach of elections. As the re-
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36. This point is made in Eichengreen (2005) in a critique of previous attempts to draw im-
plications for the United States of the experience of other countries.maining chapters of this volume reveal, other investigators taking entirely
diﬀerent analytical approaches similarly ﬁnd it diﬃcult to agree whether
an abrupt current account reversal is in the cards or whether there is still
hope that the United States will be able to bring its current account deﬁcit
down to sustainable levels gradually and smoothly over time. It would be
nice if it did, but history provides no simple answer to this question.
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Appendix
Table 6A.1 Countries in the sample
































































































































































VenezuelaTable 6A.2 Incidence of reversals: Gold standard and Interwar periods
Country Year Country Year
Argentina 1885 Argentina 1924
1889 1926
1898 1931
Australia 1891 Australia 1931
1903 Belgium 1927




Canada 1891 Denmark 1921
1913 1925








Germany 1913 The Netherlands 1921
Japan 1899 1932
1901 Norway 1931
The Netherlands 1911 1931
Norway 1901 Portugal 1924




1899 United Kingdom 1919
United States 1896 1932
Source: See text.
Note: These episodes list only the ﬁrst year of successive-year reversals and exclude wartime
reversals, using the REV1 deﬁnition.Table 6A.3 Incidence of reversals: Bretton Woods and Post-Bretton Woods periods
Country Year Country Year








France 1948 Belgium 1983
1959 1992
Germany 1952 Belize 1984
1967 1995
Italy 1950 Brazil 1977
1964 1981
Japan 1954 Canada 1982
The Netherlands 1949 1994
1958 Chile 1974
1967 1982
Norway 1950 Colombia 1973
1964 1984




United Kingdom 1948 Egypt 1982
Egypt 1987 New Zealand 1976
1989 1986










Greece 1986 Romania 1993









Israel 1976 Sweden 1982
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Comment Frederic S. Mishkin
This conference is focusing on one of the hot topics facing economic poli-
cymakers today: when you see a large current account deﬁcit like the one
we are currently facing in the United States, should you get nervous about
a reversal? Speciﬁcally, how costly in terms of output losses might a cur-
rent account reversal be? The excellent paper by Adalet and Eichengreen
takes a ﬁrst cut at the historical data to ﬁnd some answers to these ques-
tions.
What do Adalet and Eichengreen ﬁnd? First, they ﬁnd that current ac-
count reversals are smaller, less frequent, and are followed by smaller out-
put losses in the gold standard period. This result remains true controlling
for the size of the initial current account deﬁcit, overvaluation of the ex-
change rate, or the state of the global economy. Second, the interwar pe-
riod has frequent reversals with high output costs. Third, the Bretton
Woods period has few current account reversals that tend to be small but
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tional Bureau of Economic Research.that have high output costs. Fourth, in the most recent period, current ac-
count reversals have been frequent, but they tend to have low output costs.
The documentation of these facts in the historical data are worthwhile,
and Adalet and Eichengreen are to be commended for producing them.
However, we have to ask what we have learned from these results? Do they
help us answer the questions posed in this paper and in this conference? I
am not sure. The basic problem is that without more theory to motivate the
empirical ﬁndings, I ﬁnd it very diﬃcult to assess what these results mean.
This is not meant to be a criticism of Adalet and Eichengreen’s paper be-
cause they acknowledge this problem and do not overstate their conclu-
sions. Let me outline what concerns I have about interpreting their results
and why they do not provide answers to the basic questions the paper fo-
cuses on.
The ﬁrst problem that I have with the results is that they focus on output
losses. When I think about the cost of current account reversals, I suspect
that information about consumption declines would be more informative
than output declines. To see this, let me propose the following thought ex-
periment. Suppose that a country has a large current account deﬁcit be-
cause the country has excellent investment opportunities, but then these
investment opportunities recede. As a result of more limited investment
opportunities, investment spending would fall, and this would lead to a de-
cline in output. However, it is not at all clear that consumption would fall
in this situation. Indeed, the scenario I have been describing is one in which
there is no welfare loss from the current account reversal so that the rever-
sal should not be considered as costly despite the fact that output falls
thereafter.
On the other hand, if the current account reversal is followed not only by
a decline in output, but also by a fall in consumption, it would be far more
likely that a welfare loss has occurred. It is not that I think that examining
what happens to output after a reversal is uninteresting, but I think what
happens to consumption would tell us more about whether we should
worry about current account reversals. Adalet and Eichengreen may have
looked only at output losses because consumption data is harder to come
by, but nevertheless we should be cautious in interpreting their results as
telling us when current account reversals are costly.
The second problem I have with interpreting the results in this paper is
that the empirical analysis does not look at or give us a clue as to what the
source of the initial current account deﬁcits is. If a current account deﬁcit
occurs because of productive investments, a reversal may be less likely to
happen, and if it does occur, it would be less likely to be harmful. In this
case, the current account deﬁcit reﬂects welfare enhancing behavior be-
cause the capital inﬂow has enabled productive investment to take place
that would have not occurred otherwise. Because periods of productive in-
vestment are probably quite persistent, a sharp reversal would be unlikely.
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productive, the economy may turn down, but this is not due to the reversal
but rather to the decline in investment opportunities, which is certainly not
caused by the reversal. If the empirical analysis told us more about the
source of the initial current account deﬁcits and why the reversal occurs,
we might be able to get a better handle on when reversals are more likely to
occur and whether the reversal actually tells us that the initial deﬁcit and
later reversal has been bad for the economy.
The third problem with the empirical work is that it does not take into
account the state of the ﬁnancial system before the reversal occurs. I actu-
ally found this surprising because of the excellent and proliﬁc historical
work that Barry Eichengreen has done on ﬁnancial crises. When you look
at the historical record, the nastiest current account reversals occur when
the ﬁnancial system is initially weak. Recent examples are the current ac-
count reversals in Chile in 1982 to 1983, Mexico in 1994 to 1995, and East
Asia in 1997 to 1998. Weak ﬁnancial sectors often lead to high current ac-
count deﬁcits as I document in a recent book I am working on (Mishkin
2006). With inadequate prudential regulation and supervision and a gov-
ernment safety net for the banking sector, banks have incentives to borrow
funds from abroad and use them to make very risky loans. If the loans pay
oﬀ, the banks do well, and if they do not, the taxpayer foots the bill because
he or she pays for the bailout of the banking system. The resulting in-
creased risk taking on the part of banks eventually leads to many bad loans
and a deterioration of bank balance sheets. If the deterioration is bad
enough it can lead to a ﬁnancial crisis in which lending collapses, not only
by domestic ﬁnancial institutions but also by foreign institutions. The re-
sult is that investment collapses, the economy goes into a recession or a de-
pression, and the current account deﬁcit reverses when foreigners (and do-
mestic residents) pull their money out of the economy. In this situation, it
is the weak ﬁnancial sector that leads to the ﬁnancial crisis that devastates
the economy and also produces the sharp current account reversal. Know-
ing the state of the ﬁnancial sector when there is an initial current account
deﬁcit should thus tell us a lot about whether a reversal is likely and, if it
occurs, whether it will be associated with a sharp decline in output.
The theoretical and empirical work on what causes ﬁnancial crises in
emerging market countries also tells us that an important initial condition
that we should be looking at when there is a current account deﬁcit is
whether there is substantial liability dollarization: that is, a debt structure
in which borrowing is predominantly denominated in foreign currencies.
Liability dollarization makes an emerging market economy ﬁnancially
very fragile because a current account reversal that is likely to be accom-
panied by a decline in the value of the currency blows up balance sheets.
When the currency depreciates, the value of the foreign-denominated debt
goes up in domestic currency terms. Because many of the ﬁrms that are
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they produce and therefore their assets priced in domestic currency, the de-
preciation does not raise asset values while it does cause liabilities to rise.
The outcome of a current account reversal when there is liability dollar-
ization is then more likely to be a ﬁnancial crisis and a sharp contraction in
economic activity. The empirical analysis in the paper does not control for
the degree of liability dollarization, which could provide a lot of informa-
tion about whether a current account reversal will be costly and even
whether it might be more likely to occur.
My bottom line on the paper is that it does provide useful facts. It does
demonstrate the important result that not all current account reversals are
harmful. A current account deﬁcit by itself should not scare us, but if it is
occurring for the wrong reasons, then we indeed should be very nervous
about it.
The paper also points out a mystery. The gold standard period is pretty
benign: there are fewer current account reversals, and when they occur
they are associated with low output costs. Why? With more theoretical
grounding to the empirical analysis, maybe we can solve this mystery. Fur-
thermore, with more theory and better control variables, we might be bet-
ter able to assess how bad current account reversals are likely to be and
whether they are a big problem.
It also is worth pointing out that this paper cannot not tell us much
about what is on everyone’s mind in a conference like this one. How much
should we worry about the huge current account deﬁcits in the United
States that we are seeing lately? The empirical analysis in the paper lumps
emerging market countries and industrialized countries together. Com-
paring advanced countries like the United States or those in western Eu-
rope with emerging market countries like Brazil, Argentina, Korea, or In-
donesia is like comparing apples and oranges. The institutional framework
and debt structure in emerging market countries is completely diﬀerent
from advanced countries, something that I have emphasized in much of my
work on emerging market countries. Thus, we would expect that their ex-
periences with current account reversals would be likely to be very diﬀer-
ent. If we want to understand whether we in the United States are in dan-
ger from our current account deﬁcits, looking at samples that include
emerging market countries but do not control for the type of country may
not be very helpful.
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